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FIRST ARTICLE.

The law of husband and wife is in a state of transition. It is
adapting itself to the changes in property which have taken place
since the rules of the common law sprung up, and to the higher
estimation of woman at present entertained. The terms baron and
feme covert are passing out of the law, and with them much that
they imply-the husband's supremacy-the wife's subjugation, the
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many disabilities under which she labored, .from a consideration of
which Blackstone was led to conclude, with grave irony, that the
female sex is a great favorite of the common law. Not a little of
the old learning will, we apprehend, at no distant day, be made obsolete by statutes, most truly to be entitled "enabling" or "manumitting statutes." Such are those recently passed in New York
and California, enabling a married woman to hold all her property,
whether acquired before or after her marriage, and to manage it
herself, with perfect freedom from the control and liabilities of her
husband.
Other States are arriving at the same results more
gradually.
With these statutes we have nothing to do, nor with the action
of those courts which have, to a greater or less degree, anticipated
what we cannot but regard as more properly within the province of
the legislative branch of the government. But confining our attention to the universally applicable doctrines of the law on the subject
in hand, we propose to discuss, as well as we may, the many and
difficult questions which will present themselves.
Our subject simply and naturally divides itself into four general
questions. Adopting these natural divisions, we shall inquire,
First. What are choses in action ?
Secondly. What are the wife's choses in action, as distinguished
from the husband's?
Thirdly. What is the husband's power over them at law and in
equity, so far as it has followed the law?
Fourthly. What limitations, if any, have been set to this legal
power, and what conditions placed on its exercise by courts of
equity ?
The first two of these questions are in their nature preliminary,
and will not require much space to answer. The third involves
many intricate points, to dispose of which, satisfactorily, within our
limits, will be found no easy task. The fourth, though occupying
a large space in the text-books, is of minor importance, and will be
discussed briefly and upon very general principles.
I. The term, chose in action, is used in contradistinction to chose
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in possession, as comprising all personal property, which is not in
the owner's actual or constructive possession.
The name is derived from the fact that it is ordinarily reducible
into possession by means of an action. The idea of an immediate
right of action is, however, by no means involved in the phrase;
since property of this description may be contingent upon some
event, or reversionary after some prior interest. It may even, as
will presently be seen, be permanently outstanding by nature, and
not susceptible of being more fully in possession than it is.
Choses in action, then, to define them positively, are claims for
money, which is recoverable, when recoverable, by suit.
These claims may be for damages, or for a certain liquidated
sum. Claims for damages may arise out of contract, express or
implied, or out of tort. Those for a certain sum may be founded
on an express contract, where the debt is liquidated by the parties;
or by record, where it is liquidated by the law. They may be either
legal or equitable, according as they fall more naturally and properly
within the one system of jurisprudence or the other. Examples of
the former class are debts on bond or note, arrears of rent, damages
for breach of contract or for tort, &c. : of the latter are legacies and
property outstanding in the hands of trustees.
The character of most choses in action admits of no question;
but, regarding a few, doubts, now pretty much silenced, have been
expressed.
What is usually called a deposit in the hands of a banker, bears,
in legal effect, no sort of resemblance to it, but falls under the
description of a chose in action. The money goes into the banker's
general assets, and is employed by him as his own, under no obligation to return the same in specie, but only its equivalent, on demand.
He is not a bailee, or a trustee, or a quasi trustee, but a simple
debtor, the relation between him and his customer possessing no
element of a fiduciary character, as is settled by the very highest
authority.' The only substantial distinction between the transaction and an ordinary loan is, that the creditor is entitled to call for
Foley vs. Hill, 2 House of Lords' Cases, 28.
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his money, or a part of it, at any time he sees fit. As in the case
of a promissory note, payable on demand, an action cannot be
brought against the banker before a demand has been made, a rule
which follows from the indeterminateness of the time when it falls
due, which time it fixes.
From the fact that the property in a debt, evidenced by a bill of
exchange or a promissory note, passes from hand to hand with the
property in the paper, some confusion has arisen. Several old decisions by very high authority, looking, apparently, upon the paper
as paramount to what it represents, speak of and treat bills and
notes as in the nature of chattels in possession. Courts now, however, hold them, without any doubt, to be choses in action,1 since
they are worthless except as the representative of outstanding property.
Allusion has been made to a species of personal estate, which
forms no small proportion of the wealth of the country, the true
character whereof it is important to understand. It comprises
government securities and shares in a bank, a railroad, or any other
corporation.
No lawyer, we imagine, has doubted, since Wildman vs. Wildman,2 that what is known in England as stock has all the essential
characteristics of a chose in action. In the clear and emphatic
language of Sir Win. Grant, in that case, "the interest in stock is
properly nothing but a right to receive a perpetual annuity, subject
to redemption; a mere right, therefore; the circumstance that government is the debtor makes no difference; a mere demand of the
dividends, as they become due, having no resemblance to the chattel
moveable or coined money, capable of possession and manual apprehension."
These remarks apply fully to stock in an incorporated company,
which, like government stock, is, for the purposes of transfer, property in possession, to which it is not practicable to assimilate it
more closely. Bat a certificate of stock, like a State bond, or the
note of a private person, is a muniment of title to what is not in
I Scarpellini vs. Atchison, 7 Ad. & Ellis 875.

29 Vea. 17L.
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hand, representative of a claim, which differs from other claims only
in its greater permanence.'
A shareholder has been said to resemble a partner in his control
and ownership of the property of the corporation. But this statement involves a contradiction. With what propriety can a man be
said to own another's property ? But a corporation has an existence, as distinct from that of the corporators, as they have from
each other. 2 They create a joint fund for a particular purpose, and
place it under the management of an artificial being, created by the
law. Thenceforth, until the dissolution of the corporation, the
property has passed out of these, as completely as if it had been
loaned to a third person to speculate with, under a stipulation for a
share in the surplus profit of his speculations. The corporator has,
it is true, a right to vote, and thereby assist in the management of
the joint stock; but that right is his in virtue of being a member of
the corporation, not as owner of the property in his individual
capacity.
We sum up our account of choses in action with the single remark
that it must have suggested how broad and manifold are the interests
which come under this title.
IL As regards a married woman's capacity to hold personal property, there is one grand distinction which underlies the whole law.
It is well stated in the simple and clear words of Lord Coke, which,
as Lord Tentender said in Checechie vs. Powell,3 have always been
received as law in Westminster Hall.
Marriage is an absolute gift of all chattels personal in possession, in the wife's own right, whether or no the husband survive the
wife; but if they be in action, as debts by obligations, contract or
otherwise, the husband shall not have them unless he and his wife
recover them.4
The reasons for the first branch of Lord Coke's rule are twofold.
Since the law makes ownership follow the rightful possession of
I Hutchins v8. State Bank, 12 Mete. 426, per Shaw, C. J.

Bligh vs. Brent, 2 You. &Col. Eq. Ex. 279; Brightwell vs. Mallory, 10 Yer. 196.
3 6 B. & C.253.
' Co. Litt. 351 b.
2
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specific chattels, and since the wife's legal existence is so far
merged and incorporated in her husband's, as to make her possession his and her uses his, it follows that marriage devolves upon him
the absolute property of everything of which she has possession in
her own right.
From similar reasons, we should be inclined to believe, were it
an original question, that the same principle would apply to those
choses in action, the property in which follows bona fide possession
of the evidence of title. Bank notes are held to vest in the husband
as absolutely as cash, the instant they come into the wife's hands.,
And why delivery to her of a private person's note, payable to
bearer, should not also be tantamount to delivery to him, we are
at a loss to perceive. There appears, however, to be no direct
adjudication to that effect; and there are two decisions, which conflict with our conclusion.' But in both cases the Court discusses
and proceeds upon the general principles applicable to choses in
action, without adverting to the distinction taken above.
In all choses in action, unless we except the class just mentioned,
whether legal or equitable, whether assignable or not, whether growing out of contract or tort, a married woman may have a distinct
beneficial interest of her own, which will survive to her, unless her
husband divests it during his lifetime. Though his power to divest
it may be more easily and simply exercised in some cases than in
others, yet it must always be exercised in a method required by law
to change property. Thus, though the property in a bill of exchange,
payable to order, passes by an indorsement on the back of the
note, a formal indorsement by the husband would seem to be necessary to the creation of a new title in him, since nothing else can
operate as a transfer, according to the custom of merchants.
But though it is nowhere denied that the title to outstanding
property, which belonged to a woman, when sole, continues to reside
in her natural person, till some act done by her husband, it has
been made a question, whether she can acquire from third persons
new rights in property after marriage ?
IMalony

vs. Kennydy, 10 Sim. 254.

2 Dixon vs. Dixon, 18 Ohio, 115; Poor vs. Hazleton, 15 N. H. 564.
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This question it is important to settle at once, that we may go
into the investigation of the husband's power over his wife's choses
in action, untrammelled by any doubts as to what are really hers.
In attempting to dispel these doubts, it will be necessary to anticipate what belongs under another head of the discussion, and to
inquire into the rules which relate to the joinder or non-joinder of
the wife in suits at law, for around them the struggle centres.
The rule requiring the wife to be joined, whenever her husband
seeks to recover personal estate in action, which was hers before
marriage, is undoubted, and the principles on which it rests are
equally clear and convincing.
A promise, express or implied, having been made to a woman,
while sole, a right of action springing therefrom vests in her; but
while it is still a right, her status is completely changed by marriage. She has become a feme-covert, an anomalous being, incapable of enforcing her legal rights, save in certain cases, exceptional
ex vecessitate. Her "irrevocable attorney," as Lord Ellenborough'
calls the husband, must then enforce them for her, but not in her
name alone, for during coverture she has no name, distinct from his, in
law ; nor in his own name alone, for the nature of the contract and
the original parties to it have not been changed, nor has the right
once vested in her been divested by the marriage. The suit must,
therefore, be in the name of the two-in his, in consequence of his
baronial position ; in hers, in virtue of her ownership of the property.
The correlative of this rule is equally satisfactory. The wife can
be joined in no action, in respect of her husband's property ; for
she has not a particle of interest in that, which forms the gist of
such action. And this rule holds good in cases where she or her
property is the ground-work of the action, as actions of assumpsit
for her earnings, on the case for the loss of her services, and the
like, since she is his servant, and the advantage of her work entirely his.2
' Rumsey vs. George, 1 M. & S. 176.
2

Hyde vs. Leissor, Cro. Jac. 538 ; Saville vs. Sweeney, 4 B. & Ad. 523 ; Prescott

vs. Brown, 23 Me. 306.
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But, according to the old cases, where a promise is made to the
wife "upon a matter rising upon her skill, and upon a performance
to be made by her person," as that she cure a woundi she may join
in an action upon such promise ;1 but upon what principle it is difficult to discover. How distinguish between promises in consideration of the husband's money, which are void as to her and enure to
his sole benefit,2 so that she cannot be joined, and promises in consideration of services, the fruits of which enure to him solely ? If the
wife is to be regarded as a mere servant of the husband, where is
the consideration for an express promise to her? If, on the other
hand, she be more than a servant, why should not the law imply a
promise "upon a matter arising upon her skill," and so allow her
to be joined upon a quantum meruits, as well as upon an express
promise ?
Reasons for this distinction might, perhaps, be found in the state of
society at the time in which these cases come up. But we much doubt
whether modern judges would, upon consideration, countenance such
a doctrine.3 However this may be, the only question in actions of
this description, and in all those where the cause of action arises
during coverture, (other than actions in respect of personal wrong
done the wife,) is, whether she may be joined P for the husband is
not obliged to join her, as he is when he seeks to recover property
in action which was hers before marriage. Thus he may sue alone,
or jointly with his wife, at his election, for a legacy bequeathed to
her, on a note or bond in her name, on a judgment rendered upon
a contract, made with her while sole, &c.
What does this difference legally import ? By what test are we
to decide whether a chose in action is the wife's or not ? Is it hers
when she must, or when she may join? In which case will it survive to her, if the husband leave it untouched ?
Into the intricate labyrinth of cases and minor inquiries raised
by these questions, it would be alike wearisome and unprofitable to
Brashford vs. Buckingham, Cro. Jac. 77.
Fountain vs. Smith, 2 Sid. 128; King vs. Basingham, 8 Mod. 199.
3 Vid. Prescott vs. Brown, 23 Me. 806.
2
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enter. But two general answers, applying to every case in which
the wife may be considered the meritorious cause of action, have
been made, and two opposite theories built upon them, which we
have no right to pass wholly by.
The concession, it is said, on the one hand, that the husband may
sue alone, proves that the property is absolutely vested in him, so
that if he pre-decease his wife, it will go to his personal representatives. And the law, the argument goes on, is perfectly correct in
this; for no promise, express or implied, can give any interest to a
married woman, but every contract with her is, in legal effect, made
with him; and hence, as a general rule, the action must be made
in his name alone. This rule the exceptional cases are said to
prove. "They only show that in such cases, so expressly named,
the husband may assent to give his wife an interest in the contract,
and may join her in the action."'
But this is very artificial reasoning. If a husband, by the simple
act of joining his wife in a suit, may give her an interest in one
contract, why may he not in any? Why should the privilege be
confined to cases where the right of action is, prima facie, in her?
Is it not a more rational inference that she has a right created by
the contract, and is joined in the action, in conformity to the general
rule, that an action may be brought by those in whom the right is
vested?2
Why, again, should this peculiar privilege be available in a single
mode, which is only adapted to choses presently recoverable ? What
justice is there in making rights of property depend upon accident,
and in diminishing a husband's ability to give his wife an interest,
in exact ratio to the reasons which should induce him, and add to
his probable desire to do so ?
There seems to be no good reason to believe that the wife's right
originates in the circumstance of her being joined in a suit. According to the argument, she can have no legal rights, in the case of a
Bidgood vs. Way and Wife, 2 W. B1.1236; Griswold vs. Pennimon, 2 Conn. 567;
Reeves' Dom. Rel, c. 4, p. 61.
2 Richardson & Daggett, 4 Vt. 336.
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contract against the other party, for she has no privity with him ;
when the rights arose under the contract, at its inception, her husband alone was concerned; he has not novated the debt; and,
according to all legal analogies, it would seem that he alone has a
right to sue.
The wife, it is true, is incapable of entering into an agreement
except through her husband's agency; and hence his assent appears
to be a pre-requisite to her taking a beneficial interest, by way of
agreement. But, from the same reason, his assent might be conclusively presumed from the existence of a security in her name,
since, otherwise, why did he not take it in his own ?
The objection that no consideration for the promise can flow from
a married woman is of no force. For there are transactions in which
it may, as where a note and mortgage are made to her in exchange
for her real estate;' the instrument may of itself import a consideration; and if in any case the promisor could set up the defence
of no consideration, the executors of the husband cannot.
Where a gift, as a legacy, is bestowed upon a married woman,
these difficulties do not arise. And upon what ground can a distinction rest between such legacy and money willed to her before
marriage ? Like that it is bequeathed to her, and vests in her subject to the testator's debts. "The one remains in her till her husband collects it, and so shows his intention to make it his own; and
so, on every sound principle, ought the other, according to the
2
intent of the law and the giver."
The doctrine which we have been combatting, is, in a large
measure, traceable to the influence of the notion, which is embodied
in the broad proposition that "husband and wife are one." The
Court in one of the Connecticut cases express great fear, "lest the
sacred unity of marriage may suffer by innovations, in consequence
of the loose and liberal views which are becoming current." 3
But the idea that husband and wife are a unit, scarcely recognized at all in equity, was never true, but in a limited sense, in
1 Draper vs. Jackson, 16 Mass. 479.
S 15 Conn. 587.

I1 Dane's Abr. 345.
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any age of the law. As regards personal estate in possession, and
capacity to bear testimony for or against each other, and to act in
many ways, they are, for the most part, a unit; but not as regards
personal estate, to which she had when a feme sole only a right,
nor real estate, deeded or devised to her before or after coverture.
Her body is not one with his; for all actions of tort, founded on
injuries done to her person, must be joint and die with her.' Why
should the wife's existence be considered so merged and incorporated in that of her husband as to prevent her acquiring new rights
in property, when it is conceded that she can continue to hold
those which she possessed when sole ? why confine her capacity to
take to real estate ? why grant that she may have an original interest in a cause of action arising ex delicto, but never in one, ex
contractu ? It is impossible, in short, to see how the notion of the
unity of husband and wife, properly understood, lends any sort of
countenance to the doctrine in support of which it is cited.
To that doctrine the current of authority from the time of the
year books, 2 in spite of occasional dicta and a few decisions the
other way, has been strongly opposed. The authority of Judge
Reeve gave it a pretty wide currency in this country; but, though
still lingering in two or three States, 3 we regard it as emphatically
a thing of the past. The law is settled that choses in action may
accrue to married women, and survive to her after discoverture,
unless her husband, by some act, divest her title. The property in
them is hers as fully and absolutely as if she were sole, and it is
"her interest which forms a substratum, on which her right to join
'4
in an action may be founded."
But the distinction in the matter of joinder, generally admitted
to be the sole distinction between interests which vest in a woman
before and after marriage remains unaccounted for. If this be the
sole distinction, whence is it, and upon what principle is it founded?
I Higgins vs. Butcher, Yelv. 90; Dergate vs. Gardiner, 4 M. & W. 5; Fuller vs.
Naugatuck I. R. 21 Conn. 558.
2 See Draper vs. Jackson, 16 Mass. 479.
0 Hawley vs. Burgess, 22 Conn. 288; Savage vs. King, 17 Me. 801; 4 Md. 288.
4 Wills vs. Nurse, 1 Ad. & E. 74.
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Why should not similar rights be enforced in a similar way?
Why should it be necessary to join the wife in the one case, and
optional in the other?
No search among the old authorities gives a clue to the source of
this distinction, which appears to have prevailed in the time of the
year books.' And it is difficult to find, in any modern decision, a
satisfactory reason for its existence. The language of the courts
is, that " the husband may, by bringing an action in his own name,
disaffirm the contract, so far as it is in the wife's favor ;" may
"elect to treat it as his own;" "may disagree to the wife's interest ;" "may refuse quoad her ;" "may merge her existence in
his, in order securely to recover the money to his own use." All
these expressions, and others of a similar character, scattered
through the reports, apparently apply quite as well to an interest
which was in her before marriage. The property is no more firmly
fastened in her person, and her husband's dominion over it is no
greater.
On the whole, in default of a better explanation, we are obliged
to conclude that the rule in question is an anomaly, springing from
no known source and founded on no apparent principle.
From Buett vs. Cumberland,2 and various hints thrown out in
other old cases, it would appear to have been once a rule that,
"whenever the husband was to have the sole profit of what was to
be recovered and might alone discharge this, there for recovery of
this he alone may have his action," an intelligible rule if it existed,
but no allusion within the writer's knowledge is made to it in any
case since the time of Coke.
In equity, whose principles and practice are of comparatively
modern origin, this anomaly is not found. The husband cannot
file a bill there for the recovery of his wife's chose in action, at
3
whatever time the title accrued to her, without making her a party.

IQuoted Aleyn, 36, and Draper vs. Jackson, 16 'Mass 479.
2 3 Bulst. 161, Coke, C. J.
3 Longbam vs. Nerry, 8 Yes. Jr. 469; Blount vs. Bestland, 5 Yes. Jr. 518;
Pierce vs. Thornley, 2 Sine. 167.
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In this connection it becomes proper to advert to an important
consequence of the rules regulating the joinder or non-joinder of
the wife.
It is a universal principle, acknowledged in courts both of law
and equity, that debts due in different rights cannot be set-off
against each other. From this principle, it follows that in a joint
action by husband and wife, the form of which proves the claim to
be in her right a debt due from her, dum sola, is pleadable by way
of set-off, but not one due from him ; while the opposite branch of
the rule obtains, wherever, by suing alone, he treats the debt as
his. But in no case can both classes of debts be let in.'
Since the wife must always be joined in a bill in equity, a debt
2
due from the husband can never avail the respondent in defence.
Where, however, an order has been made for a settlement of part
of the property upon the wife, the remainder being her husband's,
3
becomes subject to all equitable defences against him.
III. Having cleared away these preliminary questions, and shown
-what are to be regarded as the choses in action of the wife, we are
prepared to enter upon the inquiries which bear upon the husband's
power over them ; the true nature and actual extent of which will
be found, both on authority and principle, to be involved in great
doubt.
We cannot be two well assured at the outset, and cannot too
carefully bear in mind throughout the investigation that the husband's right is a power, not an interest.
For, though the contrary is seldom seriously maintained, Dold
vs. Geiger,4 indeed, is the only important case in which the Court
attempt to argue the point; and there the assumption is made, that
the right to make property one's own vests an appreciable interest
therein; there is a great deal of loose talk in the books, out of
I Bayley,

J., Burroughs vs. Moss, 10 B. & C. 5.

Carr vs. Taylor, 10 Yes. 579; Reeve vs. Richer, 11 Jur. 960.
3 In re Gordon, 1 G. & J. 347; Ranking vs. Barnard, 5 Madd. 32; Hull v8. Hill,
1 Dru. & War. 109.
4 2 GraLt. 98.
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which not a little confused reasoning has grown. Phrases, such as
the husband's "qualified" or "beneficial interest," his "potential
ownership," and others, more or less calculated to mislead, are frequently met with.
The most usual form, perhaps, which this inaccuracy of language
takes, is, when it is said that the husband has an interest in his
wife's outstanding chattels, subject to her right of survivorship.
But if this statement were correct, his title would become absolute
the instant that her death put an end to the supposed limitation ;
and he would be enabled to recover and hold the property as completely free from her liabilities as if it were his own. He does so
hold all her personal estate which vests in possession during the
coverture. But he has no such right to that which remains in
action ; but is obliged to hold it in the character of her personal
representative, subject to her debts.'
After her creditors are paid, it is true that he is entitled to the
surplus. But so was every administrator, previously to the statute
of distributions, from the operation of which a husband administering to his wife was expressly excepted.2 Originally, indeed, he had
not, as he has not now in Ohio and Connecticut,8 an exclusive
right to administer, nor, consequently, an exclusive right to the
undistributed assets ;4 but his relation to the property during the
coverture was the same as at present.
In England, and most of the United States, he takes now, jure
mariti, whether he administer or not, whatever property may remain after her debts are paid; but, under that rule, his interest
even after her death is so remote that he has been allowed to testify in an action by her administrators.' How remote must it be
then while she is living!
From what has been said, it is plain that the husband has no
I Squib vs. Wyn, 1 P. Wins. 380; Checchi vs. Powell, 6 B. & C. 253; Hart vs.
Stephens, 6 Ad. & El. 940.
2 Butler's note, 304, Co. Litt. 851, b.
3 Curry vs. Fulkington, 14 Ohio, 100; Baldwin vs. Carter, 17 Conn. 201.
4 Butler's note, 304, Co. Litt. 851, b.
5 Hart vs. Stephens, 6 Ad. & El. 910.
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interest in his wife's choses in action, which can be described as an
"interest subject to her right of survivorship."
What, then, is the nature of this so-called interest? What are
its characteristics ? How are they to be described or distinguished ?
They are all negative. It is incapable of severance from the wife's
interest. It has no off-shoots whereto the husband is absolutely
entitled, after discoverture.
Arrears of rent which accrued during the coverture, and actions
for injuries done to the possession, are his in virtue of his freehold
estate in the wife's lands ;' but the income of her choses in action
belongs to her as absolutely as the principal. 2 If marriage gives
the husband a distinct inchoate title of his own, why cannot he
recover separately upon such title, as he would in action purely
personal? That he may be obliged to join her proves that he
recovers in her right, not his own ; consequently recovers her property, not his own.If, to sum up in a word, the husband's right be in the nature of
an interest or a title, it is entirely anomalous, and has no parallel
in any other interest or title known to the law. Can it be accounted
for in any other way ?
Coke's language on this point is sufficiently explicit and clear;
and, if lawyers had rested content with it, much misapprehension
might have been avoided. He does not say that "the husband shall
have but a limited interest in his wife's choses of action," but that
'
"he shall not have them unless he and his wife recover them."
The text-books paraphrase Lord Coke's statement when they say
that "marriage is a conditional gift of the wife's choses in action."
This can only mean that the husband stands in the position of one
who, upon the performance of a condition, shall have an interest ;
but the condition is precedent, and, until performed, the interest
dependent upon it cannot come into being; but when it does come
into being it is unqualified, and displaces the wife's title.
Jones vs. Patterson, 11 Barb. 573; Lel. N. P. 1, 309.
£ Wilkinson

vs Charleswortb, 11 Jur. 644.

3 Shuman v8. 1Reigart, 7 W. & S. 168.
4 Co. Lit t. 351, b.
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The concurrent authority is that marriage suspends the wife's
power, but does not, per se, change the nature of any contract.'
Now this can scarcely be true, if a new interest is created in the
husband. It is a power only which devolves upon him; a naked
power, uncoupled with any interest of any description ;2 not a right
in a thing, but a right to do a thing, and until that thing is done,
the title of the wife continues to reside in her, single and unaffected
in any mode whatsoever. If this view be correct, some important
consequences flow from it.
It follows that a married woman's chose in action is not attachable by her husband's creditors. By the custom of London, upon
which the law of foreign attachment in this country is founded, and
which gave the creditors rights much beyond what they possessed
at the common law, 811 property, and interests in property, belonging
to the debtor, could be reached by the proper process. But it is a
universal rule that the attaching creditor can acquire no greater
right in attached property than the defendant had at the time of
attachment.3 As, to take an instance pat to the point, where property is sold on a precedent condition, the vendee has no attachable
interest till the condition be performed. 4 It may be in his power to
perform the condition; but that fact alone does not make the property his, and the doctrine has always prevailed that a naked power
is not attachable.5 Thus, it is evident, in the words of Chief Justice
Parker :' "that the right of the creditor must depend on the particular view of the right of the husband. If his right, until some act done
by him, be regarded not as a vested right, but as a power, upon the
exercise of which the property becomes vested, a creditor, without
the assent of the husband, cannot reach the property." Accordingly,
Judge Stmnard, in Dold vs. Geiger,7 quoted above as the only case
in which it is argued that the husband has a vested interest in his
I1 Dane's Abr. 342; Miles vs. Williams, 10 Mod. 162; Salkeld arguedo.
2 Marshal, C. J., Gallego vs. Gallego's Executors, 2 Brock. 285.

3 Drake on Foreign Attachment,

238.

5 1 Rolle Abr. 551.
4 Buckmaster vs Smitb, 22 Vt. 443.
6 Mnr,.ton vs. Carter, 12 N. 11. 159; Lo Sayre vs. Flournoy, 3 Kelly, (Gco.) 541.
7 2 Gratt. 98; Wheeler vs. Bowen, 20 Pick. 563.
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wife's choses in action, grounds thereon his conclusion that they are
attachable at the suit of the husband's creditor. Several southern
and western courts have followed in the wake of this Virginia decision without a careful examination of the principles on which it rests.
In Massachusetts the point has not recently arisen ; but the old
cases, which take the same view with the Court in' Dold vs. Geiger,
have never been overruled. Judge Norton, in Holbrook vs. Waters,'
says, that "the law makes the husband's option attachable." It
would be difficult for him to show that an option falls under the
description of "goods, effects, and credits," for the attachment of
which alone the Massachusetts statute provides, or that it implies
anything else than a mere power, which is unattachable under any
statute.
This is the sum of authority on the one side. Against it are
such Chief Justices as Marshall, Parker of New Hampshire, Ruffin,
and Gibson, and a large numerical majority of cases.2 In conformity
with their opinion, the law may be regarded as settled, and, consequently, the doctrine necessarily implied in these decisions that the
husband's right is a naked power.
On the same principle, a general assignment of an insolvent's
property, &c., unless it purport to act specifically on the wife's
choses in action, ought not to pass them; nor can the assignees reach
them under a bankrupt law, which acts simply on the bankrupt's
estate. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is the only tribunal
in this country where these questions have been fairly raised and
fully discussed. Its decision, in several cases, 3 adverse to creditors,
stands on such good and substantial reasons, and is so consistent
with the law on the subject of attachment, that it will doubtless be
followed in other States whenever it becomes the turning point in a
case.
119

Pick. 354.

2 Poor vs. Hagleton, 15 N. H. 564; Barnes vs. Pearson, 6 Ire. Eq. 482; Timbers

vs. Katz, 6 W. & S. 290; Barron vs. Barron, 14 Vez. 375; 2 McLord, 374; Gallego vs. Gallego, 2 Brock. 285; 10 Ala. 400.
3 Skinner's Appeal, 5 Barr, 262; Shay-vs. Sessaman, 10 Barr, 433; Eshelman vs.
Shuman, 13 Penn. St. Rep. 561.
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It is a mistake to reason from decisions under English statutes
of bankruptcy, to questions arising under our own, when we have
one; and a still greater mistake to apply them to the interpretation of voluntary assignments in insolvency, where the sole question is what the words cover. They fasten a fraudulent character
upon the bankrupt, and have always been liberally construed in
favor of creditors.' The design of all of them, expressed in stronger
language in the more recent, was that the assignee should take all
property which the bankrupt could part with, and all powers which
he might lawfully execute for his own benefit.2 It is not strange,
considering the manifest intent of every one of these statutes, and
their provisions in furtherance of that intent, that the right of the
assignees to the wife's choses in action should not have been questioned.
An additional reason, sometimes given for this restriction upon
the creditor's power of attachment, &c., opens another question intimately connected with that which we have just been discussing.
Is the husband's power strictly a marital power ? Has he free
choice in the matter ? Can he, if he will, refuse to make the wife's
outstanding property his own, or has his creditor a paramount right
to direct and control his volition? Is his power, in a word, optional,
as between him and his wife, and compulsory, as between him and
his creditors ?
.Zold vs. aeiger&
proceeds on the assumption that the wife is in
the situation of a mere volunteer, and that, therefore, the rule, "be
just before you are generous," fully applies. But the husband, in
the case supposed, does not make a voluntary surrender of an interest. And upon what ground can his legal waiver of a legal right
be held fraudulent quoad creditors ? His disclaimer, as a damnosa
lereditas, or for any reason of a legacy bequeathed to himself,
would scarcely be considered so. Creditors could not reach it in
Miles vs. Williams, 10 Mod. 162.
2 Krumbaer vs. Burt, 2 Wash. C. C. 409; Shay vs. Sessaman, 10 Barr, 433;
1

Siter's Case, 4 Rawle, 468; and vid. Stats. 5 Geo. 3, 3 Geo. 4; 12 and 13th Viet.
c. 106, 107: 7 and 8th Viet. c. 71.
32 Gratt. 98.
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spite of his disclaimer, nor would equity compel him, on their
account, to accept the gift. If a legacy were left to the wife, the
case would seem all the stronger; since, in lieu of a formal disclaimer being necessary to divest his title, it can have no existence
till some positive act upon his part.
In the former instance it may, however, be said third persons are
concerned. But is not the wife a third person? We need not
repeat what has been said in disproof of the assertion that "husband and wife are one." Suffice it to say, that they are not one as
regards her choses in action, between themselves; why should they
be as to creditors ?
In what respect is it less fraudulent in a husband to tie up his
wife's property in possession, so that no one claiming through him
can get at it, by an anti-nuptial settlement upon her-a measure
spoken of as such in Miles vs. Williams,' but now universally considered not to be-than to allow the title to property in action to
remain in her by a post-nuptial relinquishment of his rights over it ?
However strong the spirit of the law in favor of creditors may
be, it raises no equity against a married woman, and furnishes no
reason to deprive her husband of liberty to act, with a due regard
to her interests. Debts, in legal intendment, are contracted on the
faith of the debtor's property, and whoever chooses to rely on
another's, must do so at his peril.
Unless, therefore, the existence of the wife be shut entirely out
of the question, there is every reason why the rules of law, in this
behalf, should not be stretched against her. "A man shall not be
held to do an act, in some circumstances dishonorable, contrary to
his own intentions; but the law will aid him in waiving any legal
2
right he may have over the property of another."
The husband may, in consequence of this doctrine, have a right
to money which he can get, but which his creditors cannot reach.
But the opposite view allows creditors to strip a married woman,
against whom they have no equity, of all her property, whether or
no her husband have sufficient to satisfy all their claims.
1 10 Mod. 162.

2 Parker, C. J.

Stanwood vs. Stanwood, 17 Mass. 57.
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In the development of the nature of the husband's power over his
wife's choses in action, our object, thus far, has been to maintain
upon principle two propositions, which stand abundantly well upon
authority. First, that this power is a naked power, uncoupled with
an interest; and, secondly, that it is strictly a marital power, which
the husband is not compellable to exercise or transfer.
Before pushing the investigation further, it will be requisite to
see what is the extent of this power, and in what mode or modes it
is available to bar the wife's right of survivorship, since it would be
mere theorizing to discuss its character and the principles which
control it before having laid a substantial basis of facts.
The husband has a right to convert his wife's chattels in action
into chattels in possession, and thereby make them his, as absolutely
as if they had been in possession at the time of the marriage; for
the legal title to such property passes to him by the fact of coverture, not by the act of marrying. The rule laid down by Lord Coke
admits of no division, is absolute upon authority, and, upon however
good reasons founded, applies, with equal force, to all cases of bona
fide possessions of the wife's chattels. "The principle is the same
-whether the money, in discharge of a claim in her right, comes into
the husband's own hands or into those of one who is actually or constructively his agent.'
As to those thoses in action which are not susceptible of manual
possession, the wife's interest in them is divested by an act which is
its equivalent, as her stock, for instance, by a transfer into other
2
names.
Possession will not, however, operate to change the property,
unless it be rightful and in the character of husband. This property, of which the wife is possessed in a representative character,
as executrix, cannot, by the mere fact of possession, become the husband's. 3 Neither is her title to a legacy divested by his possession
as administrator.' A similar decision was made by Sir Win. Grant,
Huntley vs. Griffith, Aoor. 452; Hill & Vye vs. Royce, 17 Ves. 190.
Pringle vs. Hodgson, 3 Ves. 619; Arnold vs. Ruggles, 1 R. 1. 174.
Co. Litt. 851, a; Thompson vs. Finchall, 7 Mod. 178.
4 Baker vs. Hale, 12 Yes. 497.
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in a case where, in pursuance of a binding agreement, stock was
transferred into the names of a husband and a third person, as
trustees.1 And it would seem, in general, that wherever the husband is in the position of a trustee for his wife, the equitable ownership would remain in her. In all such cases the husband would be
answerable in a court of equity, should he appropriate the money to
his own use.
There is a class of cases to be noticed in this connection aswhether decided correctly or not-proceeding, if Lord Coke state
the rule rightly, upon manifestly wrong principles. We will take,
2
exempli gratia, the case of Ryland vs. Smith.
There a married woman was entitled, as a legatee, to stock and
cash. Her husband requested the executor to transfer the former
into the names of certain trustees for the wife's separate use; the
latter he received himself, and employed in increasing the stock.
Lord Cottenham held that the original stock survived to the wife,
but not the increase. "The directing an investment, consistent
with the wife's equities," he remarks, "cannot be considered an act
destroying such equities by being a reduction into possession. lBut
the small sum was reduced to possession and invested without consideration."
On what possible ground can his Lordship's distinction be supported, if an agent's possession is the principal's, as is well settled ?
For the duties of an executor end with the payment of money and
the assignment of stock which is bequeathed: anything further-an
investment of money, a transfer of stock into other names-is ex
gratia, and is performed by him as agent of the party directing.
If, then, the stocks were in the executor's possession, in the case in
question, as agent, for one instant, they were in the husband's possession; if in his possession they were reduced to possession, if
there be any meaning in the phrase, and were henceforth his property. We can see no escape from the argument for any one who
does not adopt Chief Justice Gibson's doctrine that the husband's
intention is in all cases to govern-a doctrine which will be examined hereafter.
IWall vs. Tomlinson, 16 Ves. 432.

2 1 My. & Cr. 53.
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It is said in Ryland vs. Smith, that "if this transfer amounted
in law to a reduction into possession, it would be impossible for persons holding money in trust for a married woman to make a settlement upon her with the consent of her husband, without coming
into a court of equity for that purpose."
But this statement is scarcely fair. The executor, in Ryland vs.
Smith, did not "hold money in trust for a married woman" in any
other sense than every executor does; and in transferring the stock
he did not act as executor. It was the husband who made a settlement, not he ; and it should accordingly have been governed by the
rules and principles applicable to post-nuptial settlements, which it
it is not our province to discuss.
Not a few cases in this country hold language even more glaringly
inconsistent with the fundamental rule that "marriage is an absolute gift of all chattels personals in possession." Transactions of
this nature have, however, been upheld, of late, on the footing of
gifts,l except in the few tribunals where Gibson's theory prevails.
In England, the doctrine of Byland vs. Smith is virtually overruled
in two cases decided since. 2 Thus the law has been generally
restored to its original simplicity.
The husband may, also, as has been seen, bring an action for the
recovery of his wife's outstanding chattel. The effect of judgment
in such an action will be to displace the old title and create a new
one; for, though the nature of the contract is not altered by bringing of the action, 3 the old claim is merged in the judgment, and
upon that alone will the further action of debt lie. Accordingly, if
the suit be joint, and either party dies, the survivor will be entitled
in his or her own right, as in the case of other joint suits. On the
same principle, if the husband recover in his own name, the benefit
of the judgment will go to his personal representatives. Dicta, apparently irreconcilable with this statement, when explained by the
connection in which they occur, uniformly support it. 4 So, also,
I Fisk vs.
2

Cushman, 6 Cush. 20; Wood vs. Warden, 20 Ohio, 518.

Hanson vs. Miller, 14 Sim. 22; Burnham vs. Burrett, 2 Coll. C. C. 254.

3 Checchi vs. Powell, 6 B. & C. 253; 1 Dane Abr. 342.
4 Cancy h1usb. & Wife, 113.
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an action upon a joint judgment may be joint or several, at the
husband's election; "since what was before her chose in action
transit in rem judicatam, and is of another nature from what it was
before coverture."' A judgment on a scire facias brought on a
judgment recovered by a woman, dum sola, is governed by similar
rules.2
An equitable claim is, in like manner, merged in a decree; and,
since the wife must always be joined in the bill, a simple decree is
necessarily in the nature of a judgment; and it makes no difference
whether the money claimed be in the hands of a trustee of the
court.3
Where, however, an order for payment to the husband is coupled
with the decree, no ulterior step, such as suing out execution, being
requisite to the completion of the proceedings, the interest vests in
the husband, like a judgment in his name, and goes to his executors. 4
A husband has a similar power to submit a claim in his wife's
right to arbitration. The award upon such submission-creating in
effect a new debt between the parties, so that the plaintiff's only
remedy is upon the award-merges in itself previous rights of
action. 5
Thus, in Oglander vs. Baston,6 the wife's title was held in analogy to a judgment in the husband's name, to have been divested by
an award to pay to him. If the submission had been by husband
and wife, and the award had simply declared the right, the rule in
joint suits would, we presume, have obtained.
Language is sometimes used as if the effect of judgments, &c.,
were to vest the property in possession; but if this were so, since
the wife's possession is, ex necessitate, her husband's, the distinction, stated above, between suits according as they are joint or several, could not exist.
1 Selwyn's Nis. Pri. 313, Woolverston vs. Fennimore.
2

Woodyer vs. Gresham, 1 Salk. 116.
M
Massy vs. Martin, 1 Ch. Ca. 17; Richards vs. Chambers, 10 Ves. 587; Pierce

vs. Thorneley, 2 Sim. 167.
4 Forbes vs. Phipps, 1 Eden, 502; Heygate vs. Annesly, 3 Bro. C. C. 362, and
Eden's note.

5 Watson on Arbitration, 251; Hunter vs. Rice, 15 East. 100.
61 Vern. 396; Wynne vs. Wynne, 4 M. & G. 253.
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The property, in point of fact, is no more in possession than it
was before judgment, but remains in action, though the mode of
recovery and the parties interested may have changed. The debt
is merged in a security of a higher nature; and the same act which
extinguishes the old claim, with all its rights and liabilities, creates
a new one, with new rights and liabilities.
These remarks fully apply to the case of an old contract, dissolved by means of a new agreement. Such an agreement the husband may make, and thereby divest his wife's original title. Thus
lie may take a new security of such a character as to have the effect,
like a judgment, of merging all previous rights of action in itself.
He may novate the debt, by a binding agreement with the debtor.
The only prerequisite to the creation of a new title is that the transaction have all the essentials of a contract. The new promise may
be to the wife, to husband and wife, to him solely, or to a third
person; and the promise, in each instance, will have the same rights
as if the old claim had never existed.'
When the nature of the debt is such as to imply a promise to pay
any one whom the creditor chooses, the same consequences follow.
Thus, where a note is made payable to a feme sole or order, the
maker thereby contracts to pay -whomsoever the payee or her rightful representative shall substitute in her place. By marriage, her
husband becomes her rightful representative, and may, by indorsement, substitute a third party, whether himself or a third person.
His indorsement of the certificate of her stock, from similar reasons,
transfers the wife's title to the indorsee. 3 The property, in whatever, in short, is assignable at law, is changed by the husband's
assignment, the effect of it being to make a new contract with the
debtor, and discharge the old one.
A. S. H.
IBendix

vs. Wakeman, 12 M. & W. 97; Learing vs. Learing, 0 Paige, 187; Yard

vs. Ellard, 1 Salk. 177; Yerby vs. Lynch,

3 Grat. 506; Burnham vs. Burnett, 2

Coll. C. C. 2-54.
2 Scarpelini vs. Atchison, 7 V. B. 869; Smith vs. Marsack, 6 C. B. 503; Byles
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